Why do regulators not owe registrants a common law duty of care?
29 July 2026
Behind every legal principle sits a human story - often one of profound distress. The tragic case of Dr Sridharan Suresh is no different. Here, we examine how and why the Court of Appeal reached the decision that it did, and what this means for regulators and registrants alike.
Dr Suresh was a highly-regarded consultant anaesthetist with an unblemished professional record. He died by suicide on 2 May 2018, a day after he learned that the General Medical Council ("GMC") had opened an investigation into his fitness to practise. Dr Suresh had been notified by the police of an accusation of the alleged sexual assault of a 15 year old patient, said to have taken place on 26 March 2018 when she was under sedation for a dental extraction.
The appeal judgment does not address the underlying facts, but it is important to note that Dr Suresh did not match the description of the alleged offender and he denied the allegations. Whilst we do not seek to minimise the complainant's perspective, the British Medical Association ("BMA") reported that the child had been given medication during a procedure which was known, on occasion, to cause hallucinations.
As a consequence of the seriousness of the allegations, the police reported the matter to the GMC. Dr Suresh was suspended by his employers, who were by all accounts said to be supportive.
Dr Suresh's widow and children brought claims in common law negligence and pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998. They alleged that:
At first instance, the High Court struck out the claims, stating that in the alternative there would be summary judgment for the defendant, the GMC. In effect, the claim was brought to an early end before trial, and in this case this was due to the court's findings that the claims disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the claims.
Although the outcome may feel harsh, this decision was made as there was no basis in law for the claimants to obtain a remedy. In respect of the human rights claim, Article 2 is particular that any risk to life must be "real and imminent". As per Osman v the United Kingdom (1998), in order for this to engage, the GMC has to know, or ought to have known, of that specific risk. It is a very high bar.
The court found that there was nothing before it at that interlocutory stage to suggest that that specific risk was evident, nor that the GMC would have had constructive knowledge of a real and imminent risk to Dr Suresh's life. The claim therefore was not likely to have reasonable prospects of success and on this basis, it was not permitted to continue.
As to the common law negligence claim, which was an action distinct from the human rights claim, the allegations were framed as omissions to act. The High Court held that established Supreme Court authority applied to the case, namely that in general, public bodies, like private individuals, do not owe a duty to confer a benefit to a third party. That is to say, that whilst an imposition of liability may be imposed where a public body or individual causes harm (i.e. makes things worse), the public body or individual is not obligated to confer a benefit (i.e. make things better). For policy reasons, the courts are reluctant to impose duties that would distort or inhibit the performance of statutory functions.
There are exceptions. For example, where the public body has assumed a responsibility, created the source of danger which would not otherwise have existed or was in a position to control the source of danger, then liability may be imposed where it is fair, just and reasonable to do so. The court did not find that these exceptions applied.
The claimants appealed to the Court of Appeal, but their appeal was dismissed.
This case underscores previously established principles in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (2018), Poole Borough Council v GN (2019), YXA v Wolverhampton City Council; HXA v Surrey County Council (2023), and Tindall v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police (2024). In the case of the GMC, as a regulator and statutory body, their duty is always to the public at large, and not to the doctors it regulates, or to the individual patients or complainants concerned.
The GMC is obligated to perform their statutory functions for the protection of the public, and it is for this reason that a civil claim for common law negligence in situations such as this can be extremely difficult to bring. This is because the balance of the law favours ensuring that those statutory functions can be properly carried out without fear of other conflicts. This is the case whether or not any finding is ultimately made against the registrant. If the GMC were to be capable of being sued in common law, then registrants and patients alike could bring civil actions, which would make the GMC's ability to function impossible.
This principle is very specific and concerns the issue of common law negligence where the claim relates to the way in which the GMC have carried out their statutory functions it exercises. For example, if an employee of a public body brought a claim in negligence, this would likely concern circumstances that would fall outside the scope of its statutory functions, and be based upon an employer/employee relationship, where a duty of care would - in principle - be owed.
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The information in this article is correct at the time of writing. It is intended as general guidance and should not be treated as legal advice. Every situation turns on its own facts, and tailored advice should be sought before taking any action.
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